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Abstract 
 
We study two different governance modes of university-industry interactions: in the 
institutional mode, interactions are mediated by the university through its administrative 
structures (such as departments or dedicated units like technology transfer offices), while 
in the personal contractual mode interactions involve formal and binding contractual 
agreements between firms and individual academics, carried out without the direct 
involvement of the university. We argue that the choice of which form of governance to 
adopt involves different decision-making processes for firms and that both governance 
forms have important roles to play in the context of university-industry knowledge 
transfer. Relying on a representative sample of firms in the Italian region of Piedmont, 
we examine the characteristics and strategies of firms that interact with universities under 
different governance modes. Our results indicate that ignoring personal contractual 
arrangements with individual researchers, as does previous literature, amounts to 
overlooking at least 50% of university-industry interactions. The econometric estimations 
suggest that personal contractual interactions are used relatively more by small firms 
involved in technology and open innovation strategies, while institutional interactions are 
mostly used by large firms that vertically integrate R&D activities.   
 
 
Keywords: University-industry interactions, academic consulting, open innovation, 
governance, technology transfer 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, university-industry relationships have been extensively studied by 
academic researchers and have often been debated by policymakers. Empirical analyses 
emphasize the contribution of university-industry knowledge transfer to the promotion of 
higher productivity and greater economic growth, as well as the role of universities as 
key sources of innovation (Mansfield, 1991; Cohen et al., 2002; Mueller, 2006). Various 
features of university-industry interactions have been studied - focusing on the 
characteristics of individual researchers (previous experience, entrepreneurial capacity to 
win both public and private funding, seniority and tenure, gender, etc.), universities (size, 
disciplinary orientation, culture, academic quality, existence of formal knowledge 
transfer infrastructure, attention to local development, features of the local environment, 
etc.) and firms (size, ownership structure, technology/industry sector, research and 
development (R&D) intensity, openness to external knowledge sources, proximity to 
academic research, etc.). Focusing on different forms of interaction – whether they are 
formal or informal, collaborative or contractual, involving the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights (IPR) on research outcomes or not – the existing literature has stressed 
that several forms and mechanisms of interactions are often used at the same time (Cohen 
et al., 2002; D’Este and Patel, 2007), and that there are crucial inter-industry and inter-
disciplinary differences in the intensity and typology of interactions used (Schartinger et 
al., 2001; Bekkers and Bodas Freitas, 2008).  
However, most of these studies have constrained their analysis only to university-
mediated interactions and, even when they focused on academic consulting activities 
carried out by individual researchers, they usually considered these activities to be 
mediated by the university (Perkmann et al., 2009; Jensen et al., 2010). Our study shows 
that the analysis of university-mediated interactions captures only a part of the complex 
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set of interactions going on between firms and universities. Firms can also collaborate 
with university researchers through contracts and agreements signed directly by 
individual university researchers, and the latter have not been yet properly studied.  
Therefore, in our study, we focus on two forms of governance of university-industry 
interactions, which, we argue, currently co-exist and involve different decision-making 
processes for firms: (i) institutional governance, which refers to formal relationships and 
contracts with a university, usually mediated by administrative structures such as faculty 
departments or dedicated Knowledge Transfer Organizations (KTO), and (ii) personal 
contractual governance, which refers to direct contract-based arrangements with 
university researchers.  
Recognizing the existence of two governance modes (institutional and personal 
contractual) is of uttermost importance for the correct development of policy 
interventions. For the last thirty or so years, policies in this area have built on the 
assumption that universities are not interacting sufficiently with firms and that, therefore, 
there is a need for governmental action to incentivise and facilitate the interaction. This 
policy paradigm was (and is) based on the assessment of institutional interactions only, 
as personal contractual mode of governance was (and still is) often ignored or neglected 
by university managers and policy-makers.
1
  The lack of appreciation of the role played 
by personal contractual relationships may lead to the development of policies for the 
support of institutionalisation of knowledge transfer that could result in an overall 
reduction of knowledge transfer, as only a small group of firms have capabilities and 
resources to benefit from institutional forms of transfer. Institutional forms of interaction 
with university may not simply substitute for personal contractual relationships with 
individual university researchers. A better understanding of the two forms of governance 
                                                 
1
 One of the most striking examples of this policy myopia is the case of major changes in regulation for 
academic patenting in Europe. See, among others, Lissoni et al. 2008, Crespi et al., 2010.  
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and of the characteristics of firms that are involved in one or the other mode of 
interaction is needed in order to develop policies in support for institutional interactions 
only when the knowledge needs of firms are not met either by other actors in the 
knowledge market or by the direct interaction with university researchers.  
With this aim in mind, our study intends to provide evidence on how firm characteristics 
may affect the choice between institutional and personal contractual modes of 
governance for the interaction with university researchers. We focus on a subset of firm 
characteristics (such as size, absorptive capacity and technology openness) that have 
often been investigated when explaining the presence and intensity of university-industry 
relationships, but that have not yet been used to explain the choice of governance 
structure. 
The empirical investigation presented in this study relies on an original dataset of 1,058 
representative firms localised in the North-Western Italian region of Piedmont (the 
sample was developed and validated by Piedmont’s Chamber of Commerce). Our results 
suggest that, when compared to institutional interactions, personal contractual ones are 
used relatively more by small firms involved in open technology and innovation 
development strategies, thus providing an important alternative knowledge transfer 
channel for these firms.  
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 frames the discussion in the general context 
of the literature on university-industry relationships, presents the two governance forms 
and a related discussion of how the characteristics and strategies of firms may influence 
their choice of governance for university-industry interactions. Section 3 describes the 
data used in order to test the determinants of this choice, and Section 4 describes the 
methodology used. Section 5 presents the results of the empirical analysis. Some 
concluding remarks and policy implications are discussed in Section 6. 
 6 
 
2. The relationship between firm characteristics and choice of governance mode 
This section introduces the two governance modes for university-industry interactions 
that we intend to investigate – institutional and personal contractual – and describes some 
of their key characteristics and relative advantages. On the basis of these arguments, 
some expectations on the relationships between firm characteristics and choice of 
governance mode are derived. 
It has been pointed out that at least two different models of governance of university-
industry interactions have developed over time and now are co-existing (Geuna and 
Muscio, 2009). On the one hand, university-industry knowledge transfer can be governed 
by personal contractual interactions between university researchers and firms, a form of 
governance that pre-dates the institutionalization of university-industry links and has 
been in place since the end of the 19
th
 century, in Germany, and the early 20
th
 century in 
the US (Meyer-Thurow, 1982; Liebenau, 1985; Swann, 1989; MacGarvie and Furman, 
2005). This type of governance is often the result of the participation of university and 
industry researchers and engineers in the same social and professional networks (Colyvas 
et al., 2002), and is based on some degree of trust (sometimes due to a common 
educational background, as in the case of alumni associations in the US or the Esprit du 
Corp of the French Grandes Écoles and Italian Politecnici). These interactions are not 
informal: although the university structure is not involved, they are usually formalized 
through binding contracts and agreements.  
On the other hand, since the late 1980s there has been an increase in institutional 
university-industry interactions, mediated by units such as departments, university 
technology transfer offices and other kinds of KTOs (Santoro and Gopalakrishnan, 2000). 
Universities are increasingly providing organizational support for such interactions. In a 
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small number of cases, the creation of an institutional infrastructure for the exchange of 
knowledge between universities and firms has resulted from the university’s own drive to 
regulate and benefit from industry contracts and has sometimes been advocated by 
academics themselves. In most cases, however, this is a direct or indirect result of policy 
actions aimed at the promotion of structured knowledge transfer activities within 
universities (see Geuna and Muscio, 2009, for a discussion).  
It is important to appreciate that the two models of governance can and do coexist - 
particularly in countries, such as Italy, where there has been less emphasis on public 
polices to support the institutional model. Most policy actions supporting the 
development of university-industry interactions in various European countries were 
premised on the argument that universities were not doing enough to develop activities 
relevant for economic development – a view based on an assessment of institutional 
activities of the university only.
2
 These policies were mainly informed by the large body 
of literature dealing with third stream activities, such as the Triple Helix approach 
(Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 1996; Etzkowitz, 2001) to new role of the university 
(sometimes referred to as the second academic revolution), which argued for the support 
and further development of the institutional knowledge transfer model. The recognition 
of the coexistence of different governance structures implies that firms’ engagement in 
interactions with university under one or the other governance modes involve different 
decision-making processes.  
To our knowledge, the determinants of personal contractual interactions between 
industrial and academic researchers have not been yet properly studied. One important 
reason for this is that gathering data on this form of governance is very difficult as it lays 
in the grey area (not properly regulated) of outside activities that academic researchers 
                                                 
2
 See for example the discussion of how European countries have implemented Bayh-Dole act-like 
regulations for institutional ownership of academic patents partly on the basis of an incomplete evaluation 
of the patenting output of European universities (Geuna and Rossi, 2011). 
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are either allowed or tolerated to do. Many studies implicitly assume that personal 
interactions occurring without the mediation of the university institution are informal (not 
regulated by a contract) and hence that formal channels of knowledge transfer are all 
university-managed. This is evidenced by the fact that numerous important surveys used 
for the analysis of university-industry relationships do not explicitly include personal 
contractual governance as a channel for knowledge transfer, but refer to institutionally 
mediated research collaborations and contracts, on the one hand, and informal contacts, 
on the other
3
. While academic consulting activities are sometimes explicitly considered 
as a distinct channel of knowledge transfer between university and industry (Rebne, 
1989; Meyer-Kramer and Schmoch, 1998; Cohen et al., 2002; Beath et al., 2003; Abreu 
et al., 2008; Perkmann and Walsh, 2008; Jensen et al., 2010), these activities are also 
mediated by the university institution, which channels consulting income through its 
accounts and often applies overheads (Beath et al., 2003; Perkmann, King and Pavelin, 
2009).
4
 Instead, the personal contractual interactions we analyse in this study are formal 
(contract-based) agreements between individual academics and firms, different both from 
university-mediated consultancy activities and from informal personal relationships. 
While sometimes acknowledging the importance of personal contractual interactions 
(Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009), studies which investigate university-industry links 
from the perspective of individual researchers do not specifically focus on investigating 
the organizational determinants of this form of governance. Rather, when analysing the 
determinants of different types of interaction channels, personal contractual interactions 
                                                 
3
 See, for example, the Carnegie Mellon survey (Cohen et al., 2002), the Policies, Appropriation and 
Competitiveness in Europe (PACE) survey (Arundel and Geuna, 2004), the Cambridge Centre for Business 
Research (CBR) Innovation Benchmarking Survey (Abreu et al., 2008) 
4
 These studies emphasize that academic consultancies occur frequently and comprise a wide range of 
activities linked to exploitation of existing knowledge, commercialization of research results and 
performance of original research (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008; Dechenaux et al., 2007). Most of the 
literature on academic consulting focuses on the problem of whether such activities are competing with or 
enriching academics’ original research activities (Rebne, 1989), and on the problem of determining 
incentives to academic consulting (Jensen et al., 2010). 
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are considered together with consulting activities (Boardman and Ponomariov, 2009; 
Giuliani et al, 2010) and sometimes also with contract research (D’Este and Patel, 2007). 
Table 1 summarizes some key characteristics of the two modes of governance of 
university-industry interactions, which we termed institutional and personal contractual. 
We think of the dichotomy below as the description of two extremes, where in practice 
the characteristics of most interactions fall somewhere in between. On the one hand, 
institutional interactions include both “collaborative” research where both firm and 
university collaborate as partners in research (often with public funding, or in the context 
of a joint venture where both partners contribute financially) and “contract research” 
where the firm provides all or most of the financing. The characteristics of institutional 
interactions described below refer to the one extreme of “collaborative research” co-
financed with public funds, but institutional interactions fall along a continuum where, at 
the other extreme, the features of “contract research” are often more similar to those of 
personal contractual interactions. Still, some personal contractual interactions can be 
more open ended and research-based (Perkmann and Walsh, 2008), and have 
characteristics that are more similar to those of institutional interactions.  
Table 1. A summary of key characteristics of institutional and personal contractual interactions 
Contractual personal collaborations Institutional collaborations 
Individual scientist is hired as external consultant 
to work on the firm’s project 
Firm contracts with the university for the realization 
of a project. 
Scientist works on the project as a self-employed 
external consultant 
Scientist works on the project as a university 
employee  
Firm decides scope and content of the project 
Firm needs to organize scope and content of the 
project so that it is acceptable to university 
organization 
Firm organizes and monitors project activities 
Firm and university jointly organize and monitor 
project activities 
Firm “fully” appropriates the results of the 
project 
Firm negotiates with the university the results of the 
project that are going to be publicly diffused and 
those that the firm will “appropriate” 
Source: authors’ elaboration 
 10 
 
The characteristics of the two governance forms outlined in Table 1 suggest that the 
firm’s choice of institutional and personal contractual governance modes of interaction 
with university researchers involve different decision-making processes. Personal 
contractual interaction involves contracting an expert to support a project organized and 
directed by the firm. This form of governance gives the firm greater control on the 
organization of the collaboration and on the appropriation of its results, while at the same 
time it requires putting greater effort into the coordination and monitoring of the 
collaboration. Institutional interaction instead involves entering into a contract that 
compels the company to share resources and information with one specific, socially 
distant organization, the university, to undertake a project. Because the university 
institution provides support in drawing up the contract and organizing the collaboration, 
as well as sometimes in seeking external funds to support the project, institutional 
governance may permit firms to reduce the costs associated with the interaction. 
Moreover, since the academic is working on the project in his or her capacity as an 
employee of the university, monitoring costs for the firm may be lower. However, 
complexities in the interaction with university bureaucracy and increasing assertive IPR 
appropriation strategies by university TTOs managers may discourage firms and raise the 
cost of the interaction. Lacetera (2009) argues that working on a project within the 
context of his or her university employment reassures the scientists that the work will be 
carried out according to the norms and standards accepted by the scientific community 
and that the project will not be terminated early should it not bear immediate results – 
and this in turn should increase the scientists’ effort and commitment to the project. On 
the other hand, this form of governance may limit the degree of control that the firm has 
on the project’s scope and contents.  
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Firms with different characteristics may be more or less likely to engage in each of these 
types of projects, and consequently to benefit from different governance forms. In order 
to systematically contribute to the existing literature, we focus on a subset of firm 
characteristics that have often been investigated when explaining the presence and 
intensity of university-industry relationships, but which have not previously been 
associated to the choice of different governance modes. In particular, we focus on how 
size, absorptive capacity and degree of technology openness of firms can be associated 
with their choice of governance for the interactions with university researchers. 
First of all, we consider firms’ size. Small firms often possess few spare resources 
(financial resources, personnel, managerial skills) needed to initiate and organize a 
contract with a cognitively and socially distant organization like a university, especially 
if funded by research sponsors, which may require specific forms of reporting and 
accounting. Therefore, we expect smaller firms to be more likely to rely on personal 
contracts, organized directly with an individual academic, rather than to seek institutional 
modes of governance for the interaction. 
Secondly, we consider firms’ absorptive capacity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990). Firms 
which have a high degree of absorptive capacity (for example because they possess an 
internal R&D unit, or they employ a greater share of graduates) have been found to be 
more likely to benefit from more basic research projects, which are uncertain but enhance 
their research productivity and allow unexpected technological spillovers, which they 
will be better able to detect and eventually benefit from (Fontana et al., 2006; Laursen et 
al., 2011). Therefore, everything else being equal, firms with greater absorptive capacity 
are expected to be more likely to engage in collaborations focused on relatively more 
basic scientific knowledge. In turn, basic research projects are more likely to be carried 
out with the institutional involvement than by personal contractual agreements with 
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researchers because the university is involved as a partner (Hall et al., 2000; 
Panagopoulos, 2003). In fact, the institutional involvement of the university increases the 
scientists’ commitment to the research (as they ensure greater alignment with the norms 
and values of the research community; Lacetera, 2009) thus helping to lower monitoring 
and coordination costs, which would be otherwise very high when research is complex 
and open ended. Moreover, basic research projects are more likely to be at least partly 
supported by public funds (Nelson, 1959) whose assignment generally requires 
institutionalized forms of collaboration.  
Thirdly, we consider that firms also differ according to their technology and knowledge 
sourcing strategies, which to some extent are independent of structural firm 
characteristics and are influenced by managerial choice (Veugelers and Cassiman, 1999; 
Laursen and Salter, 2004; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). Firms my have different 
personality types, some are more open to the interaction with external knowledge sources 
while others are more inward looking (Malecki and Poehling, 1999). Firms which rely 
more on technology sourcing from external organizations (via collaborations, licensing of 
IP, etc.) are more likely to have developed searching and screening capabilities to 
identify knowledge providers, as well as technological and codification capabilities to 
define and specify “correctly” the content of knowledge/technology sourcing contracts. 
These acquired capabilities through technology and knowledge sourcing will permit 
firms to experience lower costs in the search for potential collaboration partners as well 
as lower coordination costs when organizing their collaborations. Hence, we expect them 
be less likely to need institutional support when interacting with academic partners, and 
therefore to be more likely to engage in personal contractual collaborations. 
Finally, some firm characteristics related to openness to international competition and 
involvement in international networks of production and ownership relationships may 
 13 
influence firms’ decision to collaborate with external knowledge providers. Firms 
involved in international competition may have greater incentives to innovate and to 
develop local and international linkages and collaborations that allow the internal 
integration of different knowledge sources (Powell et al., 1996). Similarly, firms that 
outsource more of their production and development processes may be more likely to 
experience greater organizational challenges in integrating learning and production 
activities developed in other locations (Wang and von Tunzelmann, 2000; Brusoni et al., 
2001). Outsourcing also implies the development of relational (network) skills that can 
be used in other forms of cooperation. Given the potential greater incentives for 
collaboration experienced by firms facing international competition and involved in 
international networks of production and ownership, we control for these firms 
characteristics when examining the role of organizational structure, absorptive capacity 
and technology openness on their choice of the governance mode for university 
interaction. We also control for the technological focus of the firm as we expect this to 
bias the impact of size on the choice of governance structure, such as in the case of small 
high-tech companies that are well connected to scientific-technological networks. 
We test the predictions of our framework by examining the characteristics and strategies 
of firms involved in the two governance modes of interactions with 
universities/university researchers of the same region, the rest of Italy, and other 
countries. 
 
3.  University-industry interactions in Piedmont: the UIPIE survey 
We use data from an original survey (UIPIE) sent to a representative sample of 
manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees in the Piedmont region, located in the 
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North-West of Italy.
5
 With a total population of about 4.4 million, Piedmont produces 
about 8.5% of Italian GDP. The 450,000 or so companies active in the region in 2006 
were focused relatively more on manufacturing. Thus, employment in manufacturing is 
quite high (33% vs 63% in services) when compared with other Italian and European 
regions. While Italy generally suffers from structural weaknesses in R&D investment 
(R&D expenditure in 2006 as a percentage of GDP was 1.1% vs an average of 1.9% in 
EU-25), Piedmont is better positioned with the third highest value of R&D expenditure 
among the Italian regions in both absolute and relative terms (public expenditure on 
R&D as a percentage of regional GDP was around 1.8% in 2006). In particular, Piedmont 
is characterized by a high share of private R&D in total R&D investment: 80% (€1.4 bn) 
against an Italian average of only 47%. This is mostly due to some large firms which 
invest heavily in R&D, particularly FIAT (with its CRF research centre) and Telecom 
Italia (and its TiLab research centre). The third Community Innovation Survey (CIS3) 
indicates that about 33% of Piedmontese companies are innovative, a few percentage 
points higher than the Italian average.  
The UIPIE sample was developed and validated by Piedmont’s Chamber of Commerce, 
which integrated our questionnaire with its quarterly regional economic foresight survey. 
Though the completion of the survey was not compulsory, the expected non-response 
was very low due to respondents’ loyalty and the compact structure of the questionnaire. 
The questionnaire was circulated in October/November 2008, from the representative 
sample of 1,058 firms, we obtained 1,052 valid responses (i.e. a response rate of 99.4%).  
                                                 
5
 This is the official representative sample developed and validated by the regional Chamber of Commerce. 
It is a stratified sample on 10 industrial sectors and 3 dimensional classes based on the ISTAT census of 
2001. The UIPIE questionnaire was sent together with the quarterly manufacturing survey of the Chamber 
of Commerce. The questionnaire was managed and validated by the Chamber of Commerce with statistical 
treatment for the outliers.  
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The Chamber of Commerce asked us to limit the number of questions, which constrained 
the amount of firm-specific data and information on firms’ relationships with universities 
that we were able to collect. Also, the Chamber of Commerce were more interested in 
investigating institutional interactions. Therefore we collected relatively more 
information on this form of governance. Nevertheless, they gave us access to a rich 
dataset on firm characteristics such as firm size, industry, internal structure, R&D 
activities, investment activities, exports and export performance, which allowed us to 
build numerous independent and control variables (see section 4 on methodology). 
Firms were asked whether they had engaged in institutional interactions (through 
contracts and agreements signed by university organizations) in the previous three years, 
and if so, which universities they collaborated with (universities in Piedmont, in the 
surrounding regions, elsewhere in Italy, in Europe or outside Europe). For each 
university collaboration, respondents were asked about the objectives of the collaboration 
(from the options: technological development, testing and analysis, organization and 
management, marketing, logistics, and legal issues), the amount of money spent, and 
whether the collaboration was satisfactory (based on four levels of satisfaction). Those 
firms that did not indicate any institutional interactions were asked to specify their 
reasons for not collaborating. One of the reasons given was the existence of contractual 
personal interactions with a university researcher.  
About 17.5% of firms are involved in some form of interaction with university 
researchers (institutional or contractual personal). 104 firms (9.9%) responded that they 
had engaged in institutional interactions with universities in the previous three years. We 
do not have information on whether the firms that engaged in institutional interactions 
were also involved in personal contractual ones. We can identify 83 respondents (7.9%) 
that had only contractual personal interactions with university researchers (i.e. they stated 
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that they did not interact institutionally with any university because they had contracts 
with individual researchers). Hence, the governance of university-industry linkages based 
on personal contractual agreements plays an important role in the regional innovation 
processes. Finally, 865 firms responded that they were not involved in any kind of 
interaction with universities. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of firm characteristics across different subgroups of 
respondents: the entire sample, the set of firms with institutional interactions with 
universities (which may have or not been engaged simultaneously in personal contractual 
interactions with the universities), the set of firms with only personal contractual 
interactions with university researchers, and those firms that do not interact at all. There 
are some important differences in the characteristics of firms choosing different modes of 
governance. In the total sample, the firms that engage in interactions mediated by the 
university institution are large (in terms of size and turnover), more likely to invest in 
internal R&D and design, and are significantly over-represented in the province of 
Torino and in the Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics industry, and under-represented in the 
province of Novara and in the Textiles industry. Firms that engage only in interactions 
governed through a contract with an individual academic researcher are over-represented 
in the Production of Electrical, Electronic and Communication Equipment industry, 
under-represented in the province of Novara, and also more likely to engage in internal 
R&D, although less than those that had institutional interactions.  
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Table 2. Distribution of firm characteristics across different subgroups of respondents 
  
Samp
le 
No interaction 
 
Institutiona
l 
interaction 
 
Personal 
interaction 
 
N = 
1052 
n = 865 n = 104 n = 83 
% of 
sampl
e 
% of 
respondents 
% of 
respondent
s 
% of 
respondents 
Sector 
Food, Beverages and Tobacco 10.1 9.5  15.4  9.6  
Textiles, Apparel and Shoes 15.3 
   
16.5 
** 5.8 ** 14.5  
Wood and Furniture 5.8 6.4  1.9  4.8  
Paper, Printing and Publishing 5.9 6.4  4.8  2.4  
Chemicals, Rubber and Plastics 9.9 9 * 17.3 * 9.6  
Production of Metals and Metal 
Goods 
17.8 18.6  12.5  15.7  
Machinery 14.6 14.1  19.2  14.5  
Production of Electrical, 
Electronic and Communication 
Equipment 
6.7 6.1  6.7  12 * 
Production of Transportation 
Equipment 
4.3 3.9  6.7  4.8  
Other Manufacturing companies 9.7 9.5  9.6  12  
Total 100 100  100  100  
Province 
Alessandria 12.5 12.1  16.3  12  
Asti 8.1 7.7  12.5  6  
Biella 10.3 10.6  5.8  12  
Cuneo 14.1 14  14.4  14.5  
Novara 14 15.7 *** 4.8 *** 7.2 * 
Torino 26.7 24.7 ** 39.4 ** 31.3  
Verbania-Cusio-Ossola 7 7.4  3.8  7.2  
Vercelli 7.3 7.6  2.9  9.6  
Total 100 100  100  100  
Size 
10-49 employees 70.6 74.7 *** 36.5 *** 71.1  
50-249 employees 23.6 21.4 *** 40.4 *** 25.3  
more than 250 employees 5.8 3.9 *** 23.1 *** 3.6  
Total 100 100  100  100  
Turnover 
less than 2m 30.6 34.2 *** 0 *** 31.3  
2-5m 22.9 25.7 *** 1.9 *** 20.5  
5-10m 16.6 16.2  16.3  21.7  
10-20m 12 9.9 *** 30.8 *** 9.6  
20-50m 9.6 5.8 *** 41.3 *** 9.6  
over 50m 8.3 8.2  9.6  7.2  
Total 100 100  100  100   
R&D or 
design 
investment 
Yes 35 31 *** 58 *** 41 ** 
No 65 69 *** 42 *** 59 ** 
Total 100 100  100  100  
Note: *** Significance at 1% (2-tailed), ** Significance at 5% (2-tailed); * Significance 10% (2-tailed) 
 
Firms that do not engage in either form of interaction are significantly over-represented 
in the small firms category and under-represented in the large firms category, and less 
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likely to engage in internal R&D – in line with the findings in the empirical literature 
(Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003; Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 2004; 
Fontana et al., 2006). They are also more likely to belong to the Textiles industry.  
 
4. Methodology 
4.1. Dependent variables 
As argued in section 2, interacting institutionally or through a personal contract with a 
university researcher involve different types of decisions: institutional interaction implies 
contracting and sharing resources and information with one specific, socially distant 
organization, the university, while personal contractual interaction implies contracting an 
expert to support a project that is organized and directed by the firm. Our survey does not 
provide us with information about potential overlap between these governance forms. 
Given the characteristics of our data, we have information on the following firms’ 
choices: (1) to interact institutionally with a university; (2) to engage only in contractual 
personal interactions with university researchers; or (3) not to engage in academic 
interactions at all (and instead rely on internal production of knowledge or on 
collaboration with other actors). In addition, we have more information about 
institutional interactions (such as reasons for not collaborating institutionally).  
Our dependent variable, the categorical variable Governance, includes information on 
three independent and exclusive governance decisions. Governance takes the values 0 if 
the firm did not interact at all, 1 if the firm maintained only personal interactions with 
individual researchers, and 2 if the firm had institutional interactions with universities.  
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4.2. Independent and control variables 
In our regression analysis, we test whether the expectations on the relationships between 
firm characteristics and choice of governance form for university-industry interactions, 
which were outlined in Section 2, are supported by the empirical data. In particular, we 
explore the impact of firms’ size, absorptive capacity (proxied by investment in internal 
R&D and design activities), and technology openness (proxied by investment in the 
acquisition of external embodied and disembodied knowledge). We control for the 
presence of production units abroad, export intensity, level of outsourcing and industry 
activity. Industry dummies are included too.  
The variables Size and Square Size report the logarithm of number of employees and its 
square, and they are the proxies for the organizational size of firms.
6
 We expect size to be 
positively related to involvement in institutional interactions. 
The variable Absorptive Capacity provides information about whether firms invest in 
internal R&D or design activities. Investment in internal R&D and design efforts proxies 
the firm’s research and innovative competences and, consequently, the ability to learn 
from research collaborations with a university – absorptive capacity (e.g. Laursen and 
Salter, 2004). Everything else being equal, we expect firms with greater absorptive 
capacity to be more likely to engage in institutional interactions. 
The variable Technology Openness captures information on whether the firm invests in 
the acquisition of external embodied and disembodied knowledge, in particular patents, 
know-how and informational and processing software and hardware. Technology 
openness is often understood as degree of technology sourcing and engagement in 
technology market transactions (Arora et al., 2001; Cassiman and Veugelers, 2006). All 
                                                 
6
 In our results, the variable Square Size is always non-significant. Results without the variable Square Size 
proved similar to those included in this article. They are available from the authors. 
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else being equal, we expect this variable to be positively related to engagement in 
personal contractual interactions. 
We also control for the presence of production units abroad, export intensity, and level of 
outsourcing. To measure the degree of exposure to international competition we use the 
export intensity of firms, and whether the firm has multinational activities. The variable 
Export provides information on whether the firm exports more than 20% of production. 
The variable Multinational contains information on whether the firm owns production 
activities abroad that represent more than 5% of total output. The variable Outsourcing 
provides information on the level of production outsourced (logarithm of production 
outsourced to other firms in Italy or abroad). Finally, we control for industry effects by 
including industry dummies (other manufacturing is the reference category).  
Table 3 lists the independent and control variables and their descriptive statistics. As 
Table 3 reports, some of the variables have a few missing observations, which affects 
mainly firms that did not collaborate at all with universities (i.e. the largest group 
analysed). We use 908 observations, which represent 86% of the surveyed sample. Table 
A in Appendix 1 presents the correlation coefficients for the entire sample of firms. 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics for independent variables used in the regressions 
Variables 
Variable 
name 
Description N Min Max Mean 
Std. 
Devi 
Size 
Size 
Logarithm of the  number 
of employees 
1,058 0 9.47 3.42 1.20 
Square Size 
Square of the logarithm of 
number of employees 
1,058 0 89.60 13.17 9.62 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
Absorptive 
Capacity 
1 if the firm commits 
efforts to internal R&D or 
design activities, 0 
otherwise 
950 0 1 0.35 0.48 
Technology 
Openness 
Technology 
Openness 
1 if the firm invested in 
either acquisition of 
patents, external know-
how or informational and 
data process equipment 
and software, 0 otherwise 
915 0 1 0.37 0.48 
Export Export 
1 if the firm exports more 
than 20% of their 
production, 0 otherwise 
1,058 0 1 0.42 0.49 
Multinational 
Multination
al 
1 if the firm produces 5% 
or more of their product in 
plants outside the country 
1,058 0 1 0.19 0.39 
Production 
Outsourcing 
Outsourcing 
Logarithm of the share of 
production outsourced in 
Italy or abroad to 
subcontractors 
1,058 0 1 0.10 0.29 
Industry 
 
Food 
Food, Beverages and 
Tobacco 
1,057 0 1 0.10 0.30 
Textiles 
Textiles, Apparel and 
Shoes 
1,057 0 1 0.15 0.36 
Wood Wood and Furniture 1,057 0 1 0.06 0.23 
Paper 
Paper, Printing and 
Publishing 
1,057 0 1 0.06 0.24 
Chemical 
Chemicals, Rubber and 
Plastics 
1,057 0 1 0.10 0.30 
Metals 
Production of Metals and 
Metal Goods (excluding 
Jewellery) 
1,057 0 1 0.18 0.38 
Equipment Machinery 1,057 0 1 0.15 0.36 
Electronic 
Production of Electrical, 
Electronic and 
Communication 
Equipment 
1,057 0 1 0.07 0.25 
Transport 
Production of 
Transportation Equipment 
1,057 0 1 0.04 0.21 
Other 
Other Manufacturing 
companies 
1,057 0 1 0.10 0.30 
 
4.3. Econometric modelling 
To examine the firm’s choice of governance form for university-industry interactions, we 
use the multinomial logit estimation model, which assumes independence of the different 
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decisions of firms concerning the governance of interactions with university. Our 
dependent variable Governance includes three distinct and independent governance 
decisions (i.e. no interaction at all, personal contractual interactions only, and 
institutional interactions).
7
 As we mentioned earlier, our data does not permit to 
differentiate between firms that chose both institutional interactions with university and 
personal interactions with individual researchers. To check for robustness of our results, 
we make use of additional available information on institutional interactions (such as 
reasons for not collaborating institutionally), and we model the different governance 
decisions independently using a set of binary logit models.  
 
5. The choice of the governance form for university-industry interaction 
5.1. Model estimation 
Using a multinomial logit model, we estimate the factors that lead firms to decide on the 
governance of interactions with university. Results are reported in Table 4. 
Compared to firms that decided not to interact at all with universities, firms that 
interacted with universities only via personal contractual arrangements are more likely to 
rely on the acquisition of external embodied or disembodied knowledge and know-how 
(Technology Openness), and to a lesser extent to be more present in international markets 
(Table 4; column 1). The model controls for differences across industries, but they are 
not significant. 
Compared to firms that did not interact at all with universities, firms that interacted 
institutionally with university are more like to be large and to invest highly in innovation 
                                                 
7
 An alternative modelling strategy could be the nested logit model that is used to account for similarities 
between pairs of alternatives which are similar in unobserved factors (Brownstone and Small, 1989; Heiss, 
2002; Hensher and Greene, 2002). Given that personal and institutional contracts involve different types of 
decisions, as well as the limitations of the data available, we cannot create a meaningful hierarchical 
structure of nests of alternatives. Consequently we cannot model the decision of firms to collaborate and 
the choice of governance mode for the collaboration as a nested logit.  
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through R&D and design (Absorptive capacity) (Table 4; column 1). We find some 
industry differences: firms active in the Food industry are more likely to develop 
institutional interactions, while firms active in Textiles are less likely to do so. 
Table 4. Multinomial logit model estimation of institutional interactions, personal contractual 
interactions and non-interaction with universities 
 Personal contractual 
versus no interaction 
Institutional versus no 
interaction 
Institutional versus 
personal 
contractual| 
Absorptive Capacity 
0.32 0.87*** 0.54 
(0.26) (0.25) (0.349 
Technology Openness 
0.68** -0.12 -0.8*** 
(0.28) (0.26) (0.36) 
Size 
0.19 1.45*** 1.26* 
(0.60) (0.53) (0.76) 
Square Size 
-0.04 -0.09 -0.06 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.09) 
Multinational 
-0.17 -0.27 -0.10 
(0.41) (0.44) (0.57) 
Export 
0.51* 0.40 -0.11 
(0.29) (0.29) (0.39) 
Outsourcing 
0.00 0.00 0.00 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.029 
Intercept 
-3.1*** -6.52*** -3.42** 
(1.15) (1.13) (1.52) 
Industry dummies    
Food 
0.22 0.89** 0.67 
0.51 0.42 0.61 
Textiles 
-0.10 -1.63*** -1.54** 
0.45 0.57 0.69 
Wood 
-0.31 -1.66 -1.35 
0.68 1.04 1.22 
Chemicals & Plastics 
-0.06 0.29 0.36 
0.51 0.44 0.63 
Metals 
-0.18 -0.41 -0.22 
0.45 0.44 0.60 
Machinery 
-0.20 -0.37 -0.18 
0.45 0.43 0.58 
Electrical equip 
0.31 -0.25 -0.56 
0.52 0.56 0.72 
Transport equip 
0.00 -0.09 -0.09 
0.70 0.52 0.81 
    
Observations 908   
Wald chi2 125.18***   
df 30   
Pseudo R2 0.12   
Log pseudolikelihood -480.48   
Note 1: *** Significance at 1% (2-tailed), ** Significance at 5% (2-tailed); * Significance 10% (2-tailed)  
Note 2: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Finally, compared to firms that interacted with universities only via personal contractual 
arrangements, firms that interacted institutionally with university tend to be larger, and 
less likely to rely on the acquisition of external embodied or disembodied knowledge and 
know-how (Technology Openness). Firms active in Textiles are less likely to engage in 
institutional interactions with industry.  
Overall, these results suggest that firms interacting with universities via personal 
contractual arrangements only, tend to be smaller than firms that interact institutionally, 
and also rely upon the sourcing of external knowledge via other complementary 
investments, such as patents or know how, more than firms that do not interact at all or 
that interact institutionally. Firms with high innovative and research competences – high 
absorptive capacity – are more likely to interact institutionally with universities. Small 
technology-closed firms, instead, appear not to engage in any type of interaction with 
universities. 
 
5.2. Robustness test 
To check robustness of our results, we model the different governance decisions 
independently, exploiting some additional information on institutional interactions.  
First, we examine why firms decided not to develop institutional interactions with a 
university. In particular, we explore the differences between firms that did not interact 
institutionally but had personal contractual arrangements with university researchers, and 
firms that did not interact at all with universities.  
Second, we examine the characteristics of firms that interacted institutionally (which may 
have also engaged in personal contractual collaborations, but we cannot be certain about 
this) in order to understand how they differ from firms that did not interact institutionally 
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(either because they did not interact at all, or because they only interacted with university 
researchers through personal contracts).  
 
5.2.1. Reasons for not interacting at all with universities 
The survey asked respondents to identify their reasons for not having engaged in 
institutional interactions with universities in the previous three years, choosing among 
seven options (firms could choose more than one option). The distribution of 
respondents’ answers is presented in Table 5. Slightly more than 50% of firms identified 
a single reason for not interacting; about 17% indicated two reasons; 6.4% indicated 
three or more reasons; about 10% did not answer the question. Most firms did not 
interact because they did not feel the need to do so, or because they had in-house 
competences. The third most frequently cited reason was lack of resources. 
Table 5. Reasons for not interacting with universities: distribution of answers 
 
No. of 
Cases 
% of Cases 
The firm has no need for interactions 568 53.7% 
The firm already has the advanced internal competences it needs 168 15.9% 
The firm acquires the necessary knowledge from other partner firms 88 8.3% 
The firm interacts with external non-university research centres 76 7.2% 
The firm may be interested in interacting with universities, but it lacks the 
resources for this kind of investment 
124 11.7% 
The firm only engages in interactions with individual researchers 
(payment is made directly to the researcher or to his/her own firm) 
83 7.8% 
The firm finds it difficult to contact universities 55 5.2% 
Other reasons (specify) 14 1.5% 
Note: 927 observations 
 
The seven main reasons that firms provided to explain their lack of institutional 
interactions with universities in the previous three years are strongly correlated. To create 
a lower number of uncorrelated variables, we extract the principal components of these 
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data. Table 6 reports the principal components extracted, and the variables created with 
this information. 
Table 6. Rotated load factors for reasons for not engaging in institutional interactions with 
universities in the previous 3 years 
 
Principal 
components 
Independent variables used 
 1 2 No Need 
Alternativ
e sources 
Difficult 
and 
Costly 
The firm has no need for interactions -0.45 -0.51 +   
The firm already has the advanced internal 
competences it needs 
-0.05 0.63  +  
The firm acquires the necessary knowledge 
from other partner firms 
0.04 0.58  +  
The firm interacts with external non-university 
research centres  
0.03 0.62  +  
The firm may be interested in interacting with 
universities. but it lacks the resources for this 
kind of investment 
0.76 -0.06   + 
The firm only engages in interactions with 
individual researchers (payment is made 
directly to the researcher or to his/her own firm) 
0.39 0.27    
The firm finds it difficult to contact universities 0.74 -0.07   + 
Share of Variance explained 24.5% 17.3%    
Eigen value 1.7 1.2    
      
Min   0 0 0 
Max   1 2 3 
Average   0.613 0.192 0.358 
Std. Deviation   0.487 0.470 0.626 
Note: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization 
 
Results in Table 6 show that two factors explain 41.9% of total variance. The first (Factor 
1) is that interaction with university is difficult and costly, in financial terms and in terms 
of the time required to establish an institutional contact with a university. The second 
(Factor 2) is the recognition that there are other sources and ways to develop relevant 
know-how than through interacting with a university. The firm can develop know-how 
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internally or in collaboration with industry partners or research centres that are not 
universities. In both cases, the reason that ‘The firm has no need for interaction’ is 
negatively loaded, which might itself be a reason. In both cases, the reason that ‘The firm 
only engages in interactions with individual researchers (payment is made directly to the 
researcher or to his/her own firm)’ is loaded with very low scores. This would suggest 
that firms that do not engage in formal interactions with a university because they 
collaborate with individual researchers fall into a specific group not highly correlated 
with any of the other reasons for non-institutional interaction.  
To better understand the differences between the 865 firms that did not undertake any 
form of interaction with universities and the 83 firms that engaged only in contractual 
personal interactions with university researchers, we run a binary logit model. The 
dependent variable is the dichotomous variable No institutional collaboration but 
engagement in contractual personal collaborations with university researchers. This 
variable takes the value 0 if the firm does not interact with a university (either 
institutionally or through a personal contract), and 1 if the firm does not interact 
institutionally with a university, but engages in contractual personal interactions with 
individual researchers. We estimate the basic model including all the independent and 
control variables presented in section 4, and three variables capturing the reasons for lack 
of interaction, based on the factor analysis (see Table 6). One categorical variable 
captures information on whether the firm considers interaction with university a difficult 
and costly investment (Difficult and Costly), another one captures information on 
whether the firm has other sources and ways to develop relevant know-how (Alternatives 
sources); these variables were both created from the sum of the variables that scored high 
in the two factors referred to above. We also include a dichotomous variable to capture 
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information on whether the firm indicated that it did not feel the need to interact (No 
need).  
Table 7. Logit model estimation of probability of firms that do not interact institutionally to engage 
in personal contractual interactions with individual academics  
 Personal contractual interaction versus no interaction 
Absorptive Capacity 
-0.0249 
(0.425) 
Technology Openness 
0.476 
(0.435) 
Size 
-1.153* 
(0.695) 
Square Size 
0.109 
(0.0852) 
Multinational 
-0.0387 
(0.611) 
Export 
0.0125 
(0.560) 
Outsourcing 
0.0198 
(0.0129) 
Difficult and Costly 
1.084*** 
(0.359) 
Alternative Sources 
1.531*** 
(0.283) 
No need 
0.416 
(0.440) 
Intercept 
-2.104 
(1.286) 
Industry dummies  
Food 
-0.206 
(0.845) 
Textiles 
-0.684 
(0.678) 
Wood 
0.487 
(0.972) 
Chemicals & Plastics 
-0.491 
(0.738) 
Metals 
-0.598 
(0.728) 
Machinery 
-0.387 
(0.761) 
Electrical equip 
-1.055 
(0.816) 
Transport equip 
0.092 
(0.840) 
  
Observations 759 
Wald chi2 64.28*** 
Df 18 
Pseudo R2 0.21 
Log pseudolikelihood -109.8 
Note 1: *** Significance at 1% (2-tailed), ** Significance at 5% (2-tailed); * Significance 10% (2-tailed),  
Note 2: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
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Table 7 reports the results of the logit estimation of the probability that the firm that did 
not interact institutionally but engaged only in contractual personal interactions with 
university researchers, compared to firms that did not interact at all with the 
university/university researchers in the last three years. Smaller firms are more likely to 
engage in contractual personal interactions. Firms that engage in contractual personal 
interactions are more likely to use other sources and ways to develop relevant know-how, 
and to find interaction with university a difficult and costly investment, than firms that do 
not interact at all.  
 
5.2.2. Institutional interactions vs. either personal contractual interactions or no 
interactions at all 
We examine the factors that have led firms to interact institutionally during the previous 
three years. In particular, we estimate two logit models on the variable Institutional 
collaboration. First, we explore the characteristics of firms that interacted institutionally 
in relation to the full sample of firms, and subsequently we exclude from the analysis 
firms that did not interact at all with universities. Hence, first, Institutional collaboration 
takes the value 1 if the firm engages in institutional interaction with a university, and 
zero otherwise. Subsequently, Institutional collaboration takes the value 1 if the firm 
engages in institutional interaction with a university, and zero if the firm has only 
contractual personal interactions. Results are presented in Table 8. 
The first column of Table 8 presents the results for the full sample. Consistent with the 
results of previous literature larger firms and firms that invest internally in innovation 
through R&D or design (Absorptive Capacity) are more likely to interact with 
universities.  
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Table 8. Logit model estimation of institutional collaboration with universities 
 
Institutional versus non-
institutional collaboration 
Institutional versus 
personal- contractual 
Absorptive Capacity 
0.832*** 0.679* 
(0.252) (0.409) 
Technology 
Openness 
-0.192 -0.962** 
(0.258) (0.433) 
Size 
1.434*** 1.246 
(0.524) (0.776) 
Square Size 
-0.087 -0.0525 
(0.057) (0.089) 
Multinational 
-0.252 -0.360 
(0.437) (0.660) 
Export 
0.350 0.0584 
(0.285) (0.421) 
Outsourcing 
0.002 0.019 
(0.0139) (0.0206) 
Intercept 
-6.546*** -3.556** 
(1.129) (1.666) 
Industry dummies   
Food 
0.861** 0.733 
(0.420) (0.672) 
Textiles 
-1.625*** -1.797** 
(0.571) (0.872) 
Wood 
-1.637 -1.355 
(1.038) (1.004) 
Chemicals & Plastics 
0.298 0.494 
(0.437) (0.717) 
Metals 
-0.390 -0.301 
(0.439) (0.627) 
Machinery 
-0.290 -0.783 
(0.559) (0.785) 
Electrical equip 
-0.354 0.062 
(0.423) (0.632) 
Transport equip 
-0.0881 -0.309 
(0.514) (0.884) 
   
Observations 908 166 
Wald chi2 108.66*** 38.56*** 
df 15 15 
Pseudo R2 0.19 0.19 
Log pseudolikelihood -245.8 -91.88 
Note 1: *** Significance at 1% (2-tailed), ** Significance at 5% (2-tailed); * Significance 10% (2-tailed)  
Note 2: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
 
The second column in Table 8 presents results for the subsample of firms that interacted 
with university, either only through personal arrangements with university researchers or 
through institutional arrangements with the university. Results suggest that larger firms 
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that invest internally in innovation through R&D or design (Absorptive Capacity), but do 
not invest in the acquisition of external embodied or disembodied knowledge and know-
how (Technology Openness) are more likely to interact institutionally rather than through 
personal contracts. 
Overall, the results of the binary logit models presented in Table 7 and 8 are consistent 
with those presented in section 5, confirming the independence of the three decisions.
8
  
 
6. Discussion and Conclusions 
This study has explored the choice of institutional and personal contractual modes of 
governance of firms’ interaction with universities, which we argued involve different 
decision-making processes. In particular, we examined how the choice of governance 
mode is related to characteristics and strategies of firms. To address this issue empirically, 
we used data from an original survey, UIPIE, targeting a representative sample of 
manufacturing firms with more than 10 employees that Piedmont’s Chamber of 
Commerce selects and maintains for its regular quarterly regional economic foresight 
survey.  
While much of the existing literature on university-industry knowledge transfer focuses 
on collaborations mediated by the university, even when focusing on academic 
consultancy (see, e.g. Bercovitz and Feldman, 2006), we show that interactions and 
knowledge transfer also frequently happen through direct contractual personal 
arrangements between firms and individual academics. Our data show that the majority 
of firms in the region (82.2%) did not collaborate with universities, 9.9% relied on 
institutional collaborations with university, and 7.9% engaged only in personal 
contractual interactions with specific university researchers. As firms that have 
                                                 
8
 As an additional robustness check we ran a Heckman probit analysis to account for the selection 
mechanism in the firm’s decision-making process: the model was statistically rejected.  
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institutional interactions may also have personal contractual ones, the latter form of 
governance is likely to be as frequent as the former. Ignoring personal contractual 
arrangements with individual researchers, as does previous literature, amounts to 
overlooking at least 50% of university-industry interactions. So far, research in the field 
of university-industry cooperation has focused only on one half of the picture, neglecting 
the other half and thus biasing the assessment of the importance of university-industry 
interactions and probably also providing a partial if not misleading analysis of their 
efficiency. Clearly, this conclusion is only robust in the case of the Piedmont region and 
we do not know how generalizable it is.
9
 However, the technological and industrial 
characteristics of Piedmont, discussed in Section 3, would position the region among 
those in the first half of the distribution making the case relevant for a large number of 
technologically and industrially advanced regions. Moreover, anecdotal evidence in a 
few European countries point to the existence of contractual personal relationships. Thus, 
we would expect the phenomenon to be relevant across Europe.  
This study provides evidence that the two modes of governance are chosen by firms with 
different characteristics, in terms of size and propensity to adopt open approaches to 
technology and innovation development. When compared with firms that do not interact 
at all and with firms that interact institutionally, firms that only engage in personal 
contractual interactions are more likely to be small and to engage in open technology and 
innovation strategies. Firms that interact institutionally with universities are more likely 
to be large and to have greater absorptive capacity than firms which do not interact at all. 
Overall our evidence is consistent with previous research that has shown that firms are 
more likely to interact with universities when they are larger, they have greater 
absorptive capacity (e.g. they are more research-intensive and have greater innovative 
                                                 
9
 We are currently carrying out a new survey in three other European regions (in The Netherlands, Spain 
and The Uk) and Piedmont to assess the importance of personal contractual relationships outside Italy. 
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capabilities) and they adopt open information and knowledge searching and scanning 
strategies (Mohnen and Hoareau, 2003; Arundel and Geuna, 2004; Laursen and Salter, 
2004; Fontana et al., 2006; Bodas Freitas et al., 2011).   
However, while previous studies have not provided any insights on how these 
characteristics are associated with different propensity to use either institutional or 
personal contractual governance modes for their interactions with university, our analysis 
suggests that size and technology openness have an effect on the choice of governance 
mode. In particular, large firms with strong absorptive capacity are only more likely to 
engage in institutional collaborations, but not more likely to engage in personal 
contractual interactions with university researchers. Moreover, while previous research 
has shown that open information and knowledge searching and scanning strategies are 
positively associated with firms’ collaboration with universities (Laursen and Salter, 
2004; Bodas Freitas et al., 2011), our evidence suggests that technology-open firms are 
more likely to interact with universities under personal contractual rather than 
institutional governance mode.  
These results allow us to derive some policy implications. First, the presence of personal 
contractual interactions between small firms and university researchers suggest that it is 
possible for small firms to engage in knowledge transfer activities without relying on any 
institutionalized infrastructure for knowledge transfer, which contrasts with the claims 
made by the proponents of the Bayh-Dole act, who saw the institutionalization of 
knowledge transfer processes as essential in order to involve small firms (see Schacht, 
2005; Feldman and Stewart, 2006). Since small firms seem more likely to use personal 
contracts to interact with university researchers, policy measures supporting this form of 
interaction rather than supporting the institutionalization of knowledge transfer could be 
particularly beneficial for small firms. Firms that find it difficult to interact with the 
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university and lack the resources to do that could still benefit very much from the 
interaction with university researchers not mediated (and sometimes complicated) by the 
institutional bureaucratic university infrastructure. Facilities for meeting researchers and 
more generally support for getting better connected to the technological and scientific 
network also for those companies that cannot access that through their employees’ 
educational network (such as in the case of engineers of the Politecnico) would probably 
be effective policies in support of contractual personal relationships.  
Second, our results suggest that individual academic researchers, being involved in 
contractual personal interactions, which are as prevalent as institutional ones, may play 
an important role in regional knowledge transfer. This is especially important in the case 
of interactions between firms and academics based within the same region, where the 
existence of local network links may minimize the transaction costs involved in setting 
up personal contractual relationships compared to establishing institutional arrangements. 
Therefore, the development of a legal status for different forms of personal contracts 
between university researchers and firms (through revision of universities career rules, 
and accumulation of industrial activities, possibility of temporary exchanges, etc…) 
should be considered as highly in the policy agenda as the improvement of the existing 
mechanisms supporting institutional collaboration. 
Clearly, this study is not without its limitations. Firms that engage in institutional 
interactions with universities may also use personal contracts, and the two forms of 
interaction can be complementary. However, the data do not allow us to develop a more 
fine-grained classification of these typologies in terms of companies that use both types 
of interactions, those that only use personal contracts and those that only rely upon 
interactions mediated by university institutions. Work in this direction based on a new 
survey of industry inventors is ongoing (ref, 2012). Further research is needed to examine 
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the specific contribution to the process of knowledge development and the integration of 
the different forms of interaction with university research.  
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A. Correlation coefficients of the independent and control variables for all firms 
 
Innovative 
Capabilities 
Technology 
Openness  
Size Square Size 
Multination
al 
Export Outsourcing 
Innovative Capabilities 1       
Technology Openness  0.230** 1      
Size 0.307** 0.371** 1     
Square Size 0.295** 0.355** 0.969** 1    
Multinational 0.075* 0.158** 0.149** 0.135** 1   
Export 0.205** 0.201** 0.428** 0.409** 0.149** 1  
Outsourcing 0.081* 0.116** 0.142** 0.151** 0.647** 0.128** 1 
Note: 908 firms 
 
 
 
